Germany

Failed Putsch

By 1923 Adolf Hitler had become convinced that he could take power by emulating Benito Mussolini's dramatic march on Rome—a march on Berlin that would put the Nazis in power.1 However, the realities of Germany's political structure presented formidable barriers. The constitution and the federal arrangement of the state governments made a German-flavored repeat of Benito’s march highly unlikely.2

Despite all their violence and hate speech, influential conservatives like Wilhelm Knilling in Bavaria still believed that the Nazis could see the light—and become useful to their own politicking. Among them was General Hermann von Lossow, the Bavarian army commander, who viewed the burgeoning Nazi movement as a misdirected force rather than a malevolent threat. He, along with regional governor Eugen von Kahr, openly supported the Nazis' right to protest.3 This misguided optimism opened the door that the Nazis were prepared to smash through anyway.

March on the Capital

As tensions in Germany escalated, paramilitary groups began to surrender their weapons to the army, led by General Hermann von Lossow, who was preparing to march on Berlin. Incorporating these militiamen as auxiliaries to the army, their aim was twofold: to confront the French occupying forces in the Ruhr and to assert their power through the right-wing factions that felt increasingly emboldened by the chaotic political landscape.4

But the momentum was not in Hitler's favor. General Erich Ludendorff, a revered military figure from World War I, rebuffed Hitler's insistence that he return to the Nazi Sturmabteilung (stormtroopers, or SA) their weapons now held by the army. After a massive paramilitary parade in Nuremberg drew an impressive 100,000 participants, Ludendorff was crowned their leader. Hitler was given the consolation prize of political leader. He was being rapidly swept along by the currents of events.5

By late September, agitation grew among the ranks of the various paramilitary groups to make a grab for power now. Sensing that they must seize the moment—Kahr, the governor; General von Lossow; police chief Hans Ritter von Seisser—acted. They banned Nazi meetings, positioning themselves as the de facto leaders of a presumed march on Berlin.6

Meanwhile, in Berlin, General Hans von Seeckt stood firm against the machinations of Lossow, Seisser, and Kahr.7 While some were eager to act, others took a more moderate approach. The conservative elites, among them Paul von Hindenburg, had in particular found Hermann Göring's presence in the Nazi party as indication that they had moderates among them. They found him reassuring. A fighter pilot ace from World War 1, he made Nazism appear more palatable. But, in truth, he was just as violent as the rest.8

March on Munich

As pressure from the paramilitaries mounted, Hitler’s hesitation gave way to an understanding of the need for urgent action. He would march on Munich, intending to compel the other factions to join him in the push toward Berlin.9 This decision culminated in a brazen raid on a local beer hall, where Hitler and his supporters took control of the Bavarian government, many of whose leaders had gathered there for a meeting.10

The plan was fundamentally flawed. Lacking the necessary organization and a coherent set of steps to take, it was all half-baked. When Hitler left to begin the move on the city center, General Ludendorff—whose support was essential—unexpectedly released the hostages they had taken. As the situation unraveled, the Bavarian authorities quickly reneged on their previous agreements, calling in the army to suppress the insurrection.11

The Response

As Hitler and his followers marched toward Munich, they encountered a formidable police cordon, a line of authority. The tension escalated. Shots rang out. The putsch was over just as quickly as it had started.12 The toll was grim: fourteen people lay dead, including four policemen caught in the crossfire.13 In the chaos, Hitler was injured, his arm now in a sling as a visible reminder of the failed insurrection as he retreated to lick his wounds.14

Accountability

Hitler faced immediate consequences for his insurrection, receiving a five-year sentence for high treason. In stark contrast, General Ludendorff was acquitted . Hitler's punishment took the form of "fortress incarceration," a type of confinement typically reserved for gentlemanly duelers rather than political prisoners. Despite the circumstances, the incident garnered public sympathy; around 500 people came to visit him, bringing flowers and gifts, a cult of personality putting a halo on a prisoner.15

The political fallout was severe. Hitler was barred from speaking in public across Germany until 1927, and in Prussia until late 1928. This period marked a low point for the far right, which faced a resounding defeat in the 1924 elections the following year.16

Yet, by February 1925, the ban on the Nazi Party was lifted, allowing Hitler to re-enter the political arena.17 This pivotal moment provided him with the opportunity to reassess. He now recognized that outright violence was not the only route to power. Hitler came to realize that to achieve his ambitions, he would need to do so legally.18

State of Emergencies

To navigate the often precarious landscape of early Weimar Germany, President Friedrich Ebert (1919-1925) wielded significant power, issuing rulings by decree an astonishing 136 times.19 This practice, however, revealed a troubling pattern: these emergency powers were mostly used to suppress leftist movements rather than confront the rising tide of right-wing extremism. The lack of effective safeguards against abuse raised serious concerns about the erosion of democratic principles.20

The constitution provided some mechanisms for accountability, allowing for the impeachment of the president with a two-thirds majority vote, either through Article 43, confirmed by national referendum, or Article 59, which permitted prosecution for illegal actions in office.21 They were ultimately most useful as threats.

Brüning recounted a conversation with Gregor Strasser, who indicated that immediately after the Reichstag elections of July 1932, the National Socialists planned to invoke Article 59 to seek an indictment of the Reich president and to propose Hindenburg's removal from office under Article 43 as part of the machinations surrounding the Papen coup.22

Amid the crisis surrounding chancellor Franz von Papen's government, a strategic framework began to emerge, shaped in part by political operatives like Papen, General Kurt von Schleicher, and Carl Schmitt, who became the “crown jurist” for the Nazis.23 Schmitt's legal expertise proved pivotal, as he assisted Hindenburg in crafting a legal opinion that would allow for the constitutional dissolution of the Reichstag, circumventing parliamentary opposition.24

Among their most useful tools was Article 48: the constitution granted the president the authority to rule through Article 48 in times of crisis if "public security and order" were deemed "seriously disturbed or endangered." It was a template for later Nazi terror.

Plans for Power

In November 1931, a significant leak emerged from within the Nazi Party in the state of Hesse, revealing documents that outlined plans for a counter-coup against a hypothetical communist uprising.25 This move starkly contradicted the party's public assertions about their commitment to legality. In a desperate attempt to spin the narrative, the Nazi publication Der Angriff downplayed the plans as purely theoretical, claiming they were merely reacting to a supposed plot orchestrated by Moscow for a violent seizure of power in Germany.26 The plans were far from fictional.

Richard Best had briefed the national leadership on the documents in September 1932. We know this thanks to Joseph Goebbels’ habit of writing a diary. He wrote of the meeting, “What to do when the KPD [Communist Party of Germany] strikes. Concrete plan of action. I will be the police commissioner for the entire east.—[SA commander Count Wolf Heinrich von] Helldorff my military leader. We will work well together.” The Nazis were clearly preparing for civil strife, anticipating the use of Article 48 to facilitate minority rule in the Reichstag through a “presidential” cabinet.27

Chancellor Franz von Papen echoed the rhetoric of this red scare in a radio broadcast on July 20, 1932. Papen had effectively deposed the heads of state in Prussia and claimed power for himself, doing so with specious claims of emergency authority. He claimed that when “high-level functionaries of the Prussian state offer their hand to leaders of the Communist Party to make possible the concealment of illegal plans for terrorist activities…then the authority of the state is undermined from above in a way that is untenable for the security of the Reich.”28 As the historian Benjamin Carter Hett aptly wrote, it would be as though the president removed the governors of California and New York and replaced them with himself.29

Papen would pay in political humiliation. He was removed from the chancellorship in a vote of no confidence in a staggering vote of 512 to 42—the worst parliamentary loss in German history.30 Papen had hoped to stay in power by drafting a new constitution, emulating Bismarck's political maneuvers in the 1860s, believing that historical precedent could serve as justification. It was a pipe dream.31 A vote of no confidence no didn’t need an alternative majority coalition to a deposed chancellor to be proposed. The Reichstag could simply vote the chancellor out and leave their seat empty. By January 1933, this meant negative majorities and a “presidential cabinet”—or none at all—and inevitable legislative gridlock.32

General Schleicher had maneuvered himself into the chancellorship but failed to find an alternate coalition. By late January, the only option left for his bid to remain in power was to enact another state of emergency. The Hamburger Echo warned that the “proclamation of a state of emergency has no foundation in the constitution,” cautioning that those who attempted it “may know how such a game begins, but not how it will end.”

This sentiment was echoed by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) leadership, who branded any such action a coup, asserting that “a lawless condition against which all resistance would be permissible and necessary” was imminent. On January 26, Ludwig Kaas sent a letter to Schleicher and Hindenburg, echoing these sentiments, which was subsequently published in the Catholic paper Germania. In this climate of fear, Prussian Prime Minister Otto Braun warned that a state of emergency would be tantamount to “high treason under Section 81 of the Criminal Code,” carrying a potential sentence of ten years.33 Brüning recounted that Erwin Planck had told him of Hindenburg’s anxiety over potential indictment. Would he risk prison to keep Schleicher—a man he now did not personally like—in power?34

And the opposition to the far right had good reason to worry about the effects of more emergency rule. In the spring of 1932, the Berlin police uncovered SA documents that mirrored those found in Boxheim, only adding to the growing sense of impending chaos. The day before Hitler ascended to the chancellorship, Goebbels wrote in his diary about the preparations being made to thwart a left-wing coup, which included working with the Berlin police.35

With nowhere else to turn, Hindenburg decided to make Hitler chancellor on January 30, 1933. He sought control of the Interior Ministry and two key Prussian positions, aiming for de facto dominance over Prussia and its police force. It was the largest official security apparatus after the army and boasted paramilitary units and—perhaps most importantly—armored vehicles.

As the Nazis took power, fears of civil war loomed large, with Nazis obsessing over a communist revolution that would never come.36 Rumors circulated, such as those relayed by Harry Graf Kessler, about the Nazis plotting a staged assassination attempt on Hitler to justify a violent crackdown. The rumors emerged again in late February.37

The Reichstag Fire

The events surrounding the Reichstag Fire remain shrouded in controversy, with historians still debating the exact circumstances of that fateful night.38 The immediate aftermath saw the arrest of Marinus van der Lubbe, a 24-year-old Dutch communist, who was apprehended shirtless at the scene of the blaze.39 He consistently claimed until his execution by the Nazis in 1934 that he acted alone. Few believed his assertion at the time. Foreign propaganda confused things further by alleging that the Nazis themselves had orchestrated the fire.40

The prevailing consensus, supported by multiple independent investigations, is that van der Lubbe could not have set the fire single-handedly.41 Some evidence pointed towards the involvement of specific SA members, raising suspicions of a more organized Nazi effort behind the scenes, perhaps proving foreign agitators right after all.42 Hermann Pünder, an adviser to Planck, expressed grave concerns in August 1932 that if Hitler became chancellor, the Nazis would deploy the SA at the Reichstag against "the Marxists." According to Count Helldorff, the Berlin SA commander, the SA would be "let go" for a few days to carry out targeted arrests against approximately 5,000 identified Marxist opponents.43

Pünder was right. Shortly after the fire, police compiled lists of communists and launched mass arrests, apprehending hundreds in the Reichstag and thousands more among state legislatures, party officials, and civil service personnel.44 The scale of repression was staggering, with around 4,000 individuals arrested in the immediate aftermath.45

In a chilling display of their ruthlessness, Hermann Göring ordered that those arrested be executed, although this order was simply ignored by Rudolf Diels—who would become Gestapo chief in April—and the police.46 The Nazis took many of those arrested to court, implicating them in the fire. The judges found the evidence insufficient to support their claims and made clear to the Nazis that they would have to rely on summary justice.47

While there were no opinion polls in Germany to capture the public sentiment, the available evidence suggests that Nazi supporters were inclined to believe the party's narrative, and everyone else did not.48

America

State of Emergencies

National Emergencies Act

In America, one might think that we have a more organized legal approach to national emergencies. For most of our history, though, there was not much in the way of regulation. To right this wrong came the National Emergencies Act, signed by President Gerald Ford in 1976. It established essential protocols the President must follow when declaring a national emergency. It requires the President to identify the specific powers granted by existing laws, and mandates that both the House of Representatives and the Senate review the emergency declaration every six months. To end it, both chambers must vote.

The Act was conceived as a response to previous abuses—and potential abuses—of power by U.S. presidents, particularly during times of crisis. Chris Edelson, an expert on emergency powers and author of Emergency Presidential Power: From the Drafting of the Constitution to the War on Terror, notes that “the original idea for the law was to formalize the process because, in the past, presidents had simply proclaimed national emergencies and they went on indefinitely.”

This legislation emerged in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal and the presidency of Richard Nixon, a period that also saw the introduction of the Ethics in Government Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Note that FISA is a favorite target of the right, and got special mention in Project 2025’s mandate.

However, an investigation by USA Today in 2014 revealed a troubling trend: Congress has largely failed to conduct the required checks on these emergency declarations, raising questions about the effectiveness of the safeguards intended to prevent potential abuses of power.

Insurrection at the Border

Justice Robert Jackson's words in Korematsu v. United States resonate with chilling clarity: the Insurrection Act “lies about like a loaded weapon, ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”49 This act has served as a potent tool for U.S. presidents, often invoked during moments of perceived crisis or civil unrest.

The act came into sharper focus during the Trump administration, particularly with the influence of advisor Stephen Miller, who advocated for its use at the southern border. Defense Secretary Mark Esper resisted these calls, but he could not do so forever when Trump himself demanded they be deployed.50

Trump’s rhetoric during his 2016 campaign included controversial stances on torture and other war crimes, laying the groundwork for a militarized response to immigration and civil unrest. In 2018, he deployed military personnel to the border to address what he termed an “invasion” by a caravan of migrants. In a further controversial move in 2019, Trump intervened to support a Navy SEAL who had murdered a captive and attempted the murder of Iraqi civilians. Loyalty mattered more than lawlessness.51

On October 27, 2018, a shooter killed eleven and injured six during morning Shabbat at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh. Just two days later, Trump ordered 5,200 troops to the border, despite pushback from James Mattis, John Kelly, and Kirstjen Nielsen.52 Nielsen, the Secretary of Homeland Security, was able to make the deployment a simple response to the Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) request for assistance with support tasks. However, Peter Feaver, a Duke University expert on civil-military relations, described this deployment as “the predicate—or the harbinger—of 2020.”53

The surprising acquiescence of figures like Mattis and General Joe Dunford raised eyebrows. They believed that the left and right limits they set on the military’s role made it acceptable. Their supporters mostly disagreed..54 We should note here that typically the Posse Comitatus Act forbids military involvement in domestic law enforcement. But this barrier, as Stephen Miller argued, could be circumvented by Trump by invoking the Insurrection Act instead.55

BLM Protests

The response to the Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests in 2020 was characterized by an aggressive stance from political leaders, exemplified by Senator Tom Cotton's assertion that “one thing above all else will restore order to our streets: an overwhelming show of force to disperse, detain and ultimately deter lawbreakers.”56

President Trump agreed. Enraged by the protests, he threatened to invoke the Insurrection Act to quell the unrest.57 He dictated his desire for thousands of active-duty troops to be deployed in DC.58 In preparation for potential military action, aides drafted a proclamation to invoke the act on June 1, 2020. The administration seemed poised to take drastic action.59

Defense Secretary Mark Esper's concerns about Trump’s intentions led him to exert pressure on state governors to preempt any potential federal intervention.60 Trump still insisted on more action. Units, including some from the 82nd Airborne Division, were airlifted to bases around DC, but Esper ordered the National Guard into the city to prevent their deployment on the streets of the capital. The Active Duty units, having flown all that way for nothing, returned home on June 5th.61

As protests continued in Minneapolis, Trump said that it was “so bad a few nights ago that the people wouldn't have minded an occupying force. I wish we had an occupying force in there.”62 Projecting power, Trump staged a controversial photo op by marching to Lafayette Square, accompanied by military leaders including General Mark Milley, who appeared in uniform.63 Milley later recognized the implications of his presence at such a politically charged event and discreetly left the scene in his black Chevy Suburban.64

Resign? “Fuck that shit”

Several retired generals called for Milley to resign. At the time, there were approximately 200,000 Black members serving in the military. How did it look to have a General seem to publicly discount a movement that said their lives mattered?65 Peter Feaver, the civil-military relations expert, taught many military leaders at command school. Milley, who also studied under him, sought his advice. Feaver cautioned against resignation, emphasizing the military’s tradition of civilian control and the potential dangers of setting a precedent for protest resignations. “It would have been a mistake,” he warned. “You can be damn sure that the person that they replace you with is going to be as MAGA as they can find, so they will never ever put Trump in that bind again. It’s a cure worse than the disease.”66

Milley put it bluntly in a prerecorded address: “I should not have been there.”67 He wrote a letter of resignation but ultimately relied on the advice of friends and mentors to do otherwise. “Fuck that shit,” he told his staff. “I’ll just fight him.” He told his staff, “If they want to court-martial me, or put me in prison, have at it. But I will fight from the inside.” Concerns of presidential abuse of power by military leaders had arisen maybe once before in American history: during Nixon's final days in office.68

Secretary of Defense Esper, meanwhile, had earned himself the nickname "Yesper" for his perceived inability to stand firm against Trump.69 Esper’s role in all this deeply mattered. The law stipulates that only the President and the Secretary of Defense can authorize the deployment of the military.70 During the protests, Trump whined, “We look weak... We don’t look strong.” He demanded they deploy. On the same day that he strolled to Lafayette Square, he wanted the 82nd Airborne in DC by nightfall. Despite pushback from Esper, Milley, and Attorney General Barr, Trump lashed out. “You’re all losers!” Frustrated, Trump even asked Milley, “Can’t you just shoot them? Just shoot them in the legs or something?”71

Esper, who refused to agree to an invocation of the Insurrection Act, was ultimately fired. When he found out, Milley rushed to his office, calling it “complete bullshit.” He threatened to resign, but Esper urged him to reconsider, insisting, “You’re the only one left.”72 Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates advised Milley on how to navigate this precarious moment: “If you resign, it’s a one-day story. If you’re fired, it makes it clear you were standing up for the right thing.” Gates urged Milley to use his leverage effectively, cautioning him to keep the chiefs on board. “Make it clear to the White House that if you go, they all go,” he advised, emphasizing that the implications of firing Milley would extend to the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff.73

“You betrayed me!”

On June 3rd, “Yesper” found a way to say no quite publicly. Esper convened a call with his aides, General Milley, and General John Hyten. They meticulously reviewed Esper's public statement line by line before he faced the cameras. In his address, he condemned the ills of racism and underscored the importance of First Amendment rights. He expressed regret over his use of the term "battlespace," clarifying that the Insurrection Act should only be invoked in “the most urgent and dire of situations”—a condition he said was not met in this case.74

Trump hated being contradicted, particularly in public. In the Oval Office, he unleashed a tirade against Esper, delivering what Milley described as “the worst reaming out” he had ever witnessed. “You betrayed me!” Trump shouted, “I’m the president, not you,” and said Esper did not have the right to contradict him. He complained, “You took away my authority.” Except that’s not how Presidential authority works. It was evident that Trump struggled to grasp that he was in charge.75

The following day, White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows called Esper at home three times, demanding a recantation of his statements. Esper stood firm, refusing to back down. Meadows's approach shifted to threats, employing what was described as “the Tony Soprano approach.” But when Esper still didn’t budge, he ultimately backed off.76

Trump considered firing him on the spot for pushing back.77 Aides advised against dismissing a third Secretary of Defense so close to the upcoming election, knowing the inevitable political fallout could damage his prospects for reelection.78 Robert Gates later observed that both Esper and Milley “expected, literally on a daily basis, to be fired.”79

End of Summer

Through the remainder of the summer of 2020, President Trump persistently sought to deploy troops to the streets in response to civil unrest. General Milley noted that every time Trump saw something on Fox News, he demanded “ten thousand troops.” He showed absolutely no remorse for his controversial photo op at Lafayette Square. In fact, he loved the photo so much that he signed a copy for Doug Mills, the New York Times White House photographer who snapped it.80

Going into the election, General Milley came up with a plan that had four primary goals, one of which was to prevent Trump from sending military forces onto American streets.81 Trump moved in the opposite direction, threatening to “put … down very quickly” any riots that might erupt should aggrieved Democrats protest in the aftermath of his potential victory.82 The administration was at odds with itself.

Plans for Power

Just "Joking"

Trump has had a history of “joking” about being President for longer than the lawful two term limit. In March 2018, during a private donor speech at Mar-a-Lago, Trump heaped praise onto Xi Jinping for consolidating power for himself: “He’s now president for life. President for life. No, he’s great. And look, he was able to do that. I think it’s great. Maybe we’ll have to give that a shot someday.”83

Later that year, while receiving a trophy from Wounded Warriors, Trump remarked, “Well, this is really beautiful. This will find a permanent place, at least for six years, in the Oval Office. Is that okay?... I was going to joke, ‘General, and say at least for 10 or 14 years, but we would cause bedlam if I said that, so we’ll say six.’”84

At a rally with Republican representatives the following month, Trump boasted, “We’ve cut more regulations in a year and a quarter than any administration whether it’s four years, eight years, or in one case 16 years. Should we go back to 16 years? Should we do that? Congressman, can we do that?”85

These kinds of comments came so frequently that journalists had to press him to clarify what he meant. When asked once he replied, “You know the last time I jokingly said that the papers start saying, ‘He’s got despotic tendencies.’ No, I’m not looking to do it. Unless you want to do it, that’s OK.”86 It’s said there’s a grain of truth in every joke. And there have been an awful lot of these jokes.

Election Aftermath

After Trump ultimately lost the election and refused to acknowledge it, General Milley saw storm clouds on the horizon. He now worried Trump could manufacture a crisis in the United States that could lead to the military being deployed. He called Trump’s “big lie” regarding the election “Hitler-like” and feared a “Reichstag moment,” envisioning a scenario with MAGA militias in the streets, the Insurrection Act invoked, and possibly outright martial law.87

In the early afternoon of November 9, the first Monday after losing the election, White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows informed Secretary Esper that he would be fired. “The president is going to fire you this afternoon,” he said, because “you haven’t been sufficiently loyal.” Recall that Trump originally wanted to fire him four months earlier for his pushback on the use of Insurrection Act specifically. Esper firmly replied, “That’s his prerogative. My oath is to the Constitution, not to him.” Just minutes later, Trump tweeted: “Mark Esper has been terminated.”

That same day, Milley conveyed his fears to his staff, stating, “if the idea was to seize power, you are not going to do this without the military.” He had studied the coups of history, noting the need to control the “power ministries,” a fact that Hitler only realized after the failed beer hall putsch.88 After Esper’s firing, his fears seemed to be confirmed. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, seeming to reach the same conclusion, reached out to Milley. “The crazies have taken over.”89

Milley told his aides, “This is a Reichstag moment, the gospel of the Führer.”90 The next day, November 10, he attended a security briefing about the planned “Million MAGA March” in DC. He relayed his fears that there would be pro-Trump “brownshirts in the streets,” a reference to Hitler’s Sturmabteilung–the SA.91

Milley emphasized to those in attendance: “Everyone in this room, whether you’re a cop, whether you’re a soldier, we’re going to stop these guys to make sure we have a peaceful transfer of power. We’re going to put a ring of steel around this city and the Nazis aren’t getting in.”92

After the election, Milley monitored the news closely, setting up four televisions in his office to follow various channels, including Fox News and One America News Network (OANN). When Christine Wormuth, the head of the Biden transition for Defense and the future Secretary of the Army came by for a meeting, she asked him about him. Milley, sarcastic–and blunt in his typical style–replied, “You’ve got to know what the enemy is up to.”93

“Land the Plane”

On December 1st, during a dinner at his home with Attorney General Bill Barr, Milley told him that Pompeo had proposed–and they had been conducting–daily calls between themselves and Mark Meadows. The general called them the “land the plane” calls. He told his staff the mission: “Our job is to land this plane safely and to do a peaceful transfer of power on the twentieth of January. This is our obligation to this nation.” The circumstances were dire. “Both engines are out, the landing gear are stuck. We’re in an emergency situation.”94 And they somehow had to stick the landing.

In public, Pompeo presented himself as a staunch defender of the President. The day after their dinner, Pompeo addressed the media, “There will be a smooth transition—to a second Trump administration.” But privately, he was completely opposed to Trump’s denial of the election results. A senior State Department official recalled, “He was totally against it. It was important for him to not get fired at the end too, to be there to the bitter end.”95

Milley knew this was not all self-sacrifice, and maybe a little self-interest. Pompeo had to play both sides since was seeking “a second political life” after his tenure as Secretary of State. Later, Pompeo would consider a run for President. Milley conveyed to his staff his belief that “At the end, he wouldn’t be a party to that craziness.” Meadows, however? Milley trusted him exactly the distance he could throw the man.96

On occasions Milley had discussed his concerns with Senator Angus King, the Maine independent who caucused with Democrats. “My conversations with him were about the danger of some attempt to use the military to declare martial law.” King sought to reassure his colleagues who shared his concerns. “I can’t tell you why I know this,” but the military would do their duty.97

Oath Keepers

Like in the summer months of 1923 with Germany paramilitaries, American militias were getting increasingly antsy. Regardless of Trump’s own intentions, our own contemporary paramilitaries risked sweeping the White House into their tide. From a hotel suite mere blocks from the Capitol, Oath Keepers leader Stewart Rhodes tried to get a message to Trump through an intermediary. They were ready to fight. He just had to say the word. His intermediary refused to relay his request .

The Oath Keepers were serious about keeping their misguided “oath.” In a plea deal with prosecutors after the January 6th insurrection, a North Carolinian man by the name of William Todd Wilson testified that he had stockpiled weapons in hotel rooms in Virginia. Wilson was part of a planned quick response force (QRF), that stood ready to “provide firearms or cover to co-conspirators” who were “operating inside of Washington.”98

Prior to the insurrection, on December 14, the day most electors in the Electoral College would vote, Wilson shared an article in a group chat written by Trump’s disgraced former National Security Adviser, General Michael Flynn, in which he warned of “unelected tyrants.” Wilson added, “It is time to fight.”99

In his own trial, Rhodes later admitted that their objective in storming the Capitol was to gather intelligence and disrupt the certification of the election results.100 With a background as an Army paratrooper and a Yale law degree, Rhodes was not only experienced in military tactics but also adept at legal arguments.101

In encrypted messages shared via the Signal app, Rhodes was grim: “We aren’t getting through this without a civil war. Too late for that. Prepare your mind, body, spirit.”102 Rhodes grew increasingly agitated as time went on. He issued more and more public calls for Trump to invoke the Insurrection Act, reminding the president that his men were stationed outside the capital and ready for action.103 As with the march on Berlin, a march on the capital seemed increasingly inevitable.

Just “Re-run” the Election

As Trump’s election denial went on, a whole cast of characters started to come on-stage. In February 2019 the National Security Council (NSC) hired Kash Patel, a former staffer on the House Intelligence Committee and aide to Congressman Devin Nunes. He was infamous for his alleged spread of conspiracy theories that it was not Russia, but Ukraine, that had interfered in the 2016 election. John Bolton, Trump’s third NSA, had resisted the hire. Trump insisted. Patel was a “must-hire, directed by the president.” Bolton basically sat him in the back of the class, into a position at the NSC’s international directorate, far from any influence.104

Trump’s first National Security Adviser (NSA), General Michael Flynn, continued to have significant influence in the White House despite being on the outside. One of his former underlings, hilariously called the “Flynnstones,” was thirty-four year old Ezra Cohen. Cohen was pushed out of the NSC by Trump’s second NSA, H.R. McMaster. But he resurfaced in spring 2020 as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). This most MAGA among MAGA now oversaw critical intelligence operations, including the Special Forces and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).105

The pair of Cohen and Patel were grossly incompetent and enraged people like Mike Pompeo. Under the purview of Cohen, Patel had coordinated a SEAL Team 6 mission to rescue an American hostage in Nigeria just before the election. The only problem was that he did so without notifying the Nigerian government in advance. The operation was almost called off.106

Sometime in November, Cohen was in Saudi Arabia when he took an urgent call from Flynn. “You need to come home right now,” Flynn told him. “We need to declare martial law.” Cohen says he brushed him off. Around Thanksgiving, Flynn called again. “We need to seize the voting machines.” To colleagues, Cohen reportedly sounded alarmed.

Milley, on high alert for Trumpian machinations, sensed that Patel and Cohen were up to something nefarious. After Esper was fired, Milley had warned them both separately that “life looks really shitty from behind bars. And whether you want to realize it or not, there’s going to be a president at exactly 1200 hours on the twentieth and his name is Joe Biden. And if you guys do anything that’s illegal, I don’t mind having you in prison.”107

One week after his pardon, on December 7, Flynn endorsed an ad urging Trump to declare martial law. The ad called for the “temporary suspension of the Constitution” and the military to oversee a “re-vote.”108 Flynn appeared on Newsmax, the far right TV channel, discussing some historical “precedent” for “rerunning” the election. Not long after, he participated in a December 18 meeting in the Oval Office where they discussed seizing voting machines and declaring a national emergency.109

Roger Stone shared similar thoughts, suggesting to Alex Jones that Trump should consider the Insurrection Act.110 Flynn and attorney Sidney Powell pitched their plan to Trump that would have the military and marshals in six key swing counties seize ballots, recount them live on TV, and hold new elections if they found fraud. Flynn avoided using the term “martial law” this time. But despite this relative softening–and in spite of his insistence to the contrary–this would be unprecedented.111

On December 18, Trump received a draft executive order dated for December 16 proposing an “audit” of Antrim County, Michigan, which alleged “evidence of international and foreign interference,” but did not supply the evidence. It called for the Secretary of Defense—Chris Miller, chosen for loyalty to replace “disloyal” Mark Esper—to “seize, collect, retain and analyze” voting machines. Results would somehow come on a date coincidentally after Biden’s presumed inauguration. Another version swapped DOD with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Acting Secretary Chad Wolf told the White House “time and time again” that DHS had “zero authority” here. He even had the DHS counsel draft a three-page memo to that effect.112

Trump was seriously considering taking this advice and employing the Insurrection Act. He had considered justifying its use with unhinged claims of complete Chinese control over American elections. White House Counsel Pat Cipollone objected, “[he] does not have the authority to do this.” Sidney Powell replied, “of course he does,” and cited an executive order.113 Trump jumped in and reaffirmed that, in his world, loyalty was everything. “You know, Pat, at least they want to fight for me. You don’t even fight for me. You just tell me everything I can’t do.”114

As it became clearer to Trump that he was not surrounded with loyalists, he struggled to replace them with people who were. Of particular importance was the position of Attorney General. Jeff Clark, an assistant attorney general, was his guy. He had been secretly advising Trump outside of normal channels. When Trump tried to appoint him to the top position on December 28, he faced the prospect of mass resignations within the Department of Justice. Eventually Trump gave up the fight, telling Clark, “I appreciate you being willing to step up and take all the abuse, but the reality is it’s not worth the breakage. We’re going to have mass resignations. It’s going to be a disaster.”115

Down the street from these White House discussions at 300 Independence Ave, significant planning for January 6th was underway. Members of the House Freedom Caucus huddled at the Conservative Partnership Institute (C.P.I.) founded by Jim DeMint, the former Senator and later head of The Heritage Foundation, who was fired by Heritage for making them too far-right. Members of the caucus were engaged in numerous conference calls, with both Mark Meadows and Trump participating. The rally became a focal point for mobilizing supporters to gather on the National Mall.116

Stop the Steal

Incitement and Mobilization

In the leadup to the event, Trump would urge his supporters to march on the Capitol. Early on December 19, 2020, at 1:42 a.m., Trump tweeted: “Big protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!” To the militias–the Proud Boys, the Oath Keepers, the Three Percenters, and so on–the message was received, loud and clear. Kelly Meggs, a leader of the Oath Keepers in Florida, went on Facebook, posting, “He called us all to the Capitol and wants us to make it wild!!!” Meanwhile, Stewart Rhodes ominously warned that a Biden inauguration would lead to “a massively bloody revolution.”117

General Milley recalled a conversation between Trump and Secretary of Defense Chris Miller, where Trump indicated that he thought there would be significant unrest, not from his supporters, but against them. “It’s going to be a big deal,” he said. “You’ve got enough people to make sure it’s safe for my people, right?”118 For a resident of DC that summer, it might not have been hard to imagine why Trump might expect a reaction from the left.

The Black Lives Matter protests had left people on the right with a lingering feeling that left-wing agitation was the new normal. In their minds, why would you not expect a counter-protest—and possibly a violent confrontation—that would require an equally violent response? The members of the militias felt similarly. They thought Trump was ready to invoke the Insurrection Act. They would come to DC armed and ready to fight for him.119

A "Reichstag Moment”

On the morning of January 6, 2021, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell prepared to deliver a speech intended to shame thirteen senators, a circus led by Ted Cruz and Josh Hawley, for their plans to object to the electoral count.120 Meanwhile, Trump took to Twitter: “All Mike Pence has to do is send them back to the States, AND WE WIN. Do it Mike this is a time for extreme courage!.”121

Trump also placed a call to Pence, delivering an ultimatum: if Pence did not act, Trump claimed, “then I picked the wrong man four years ago.” He went on, “You can either go down in history as a patriot, or you can go down in history as a pussy.”122

On the National Mall, the atmosphere grew more charged as the line-up of speakers at Trump’s speech were whipped into a frenzy. Trump’s attorney, Rudy Giuliani, incited the crowd, saying, “So let’s have trial by combat. I’m willing to stake my reputation, the president is willing to stake his reputation on the fact that we’re going to find criminality there.”123

Donald Trump Jr. took to the stage, too, and threatened Republican lawmakers with retribution, shouting, “The people who did nothing to stop the steal—this gathering should send a message to them. This isn’t their Republican Party anymore! This is Donald Trump’s Republican Party!”124

Trump had continued to pressure Pence to “do the right thing” all morning and overturn the election results, “Because if Mike does the right thing, we win.” Pence’s chief of staff later said that Trump had called at least two dozen times, but Pence refused every time.125 As events unfolded on TV, former Vice President Dick Cheney watched the chaos from his home. He called his daughter, Senator Liz Cheney, to warn her that Trump was now inciting the crowd and invoking her name.126

“Take Back Our Country”

In the spotlight on stage, blocks from the Capitol, Trump spoke. He first urged his supporters to “peacefully” march on the Capitol, giving him plausible deniability which was predictably repeated in the weeks, months, and years to follow. But his conclusion was different. “We fight like hell, and if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore.”127

As some in the crowd shouted, “Storm the Capitol,” Trump echoed their sentiments, telling them to “take back our country” and suggesting he would join them in the march.128 At 1:10 p.m., he left for the White House instead. It was no ad hoc rallying cry that he would march with them. It was planned to be “pure bluster.” Republicans in Congress used similar talking points in the days leading up to the rally. But the president who sat out Vietnam in his youth was not about to start fighting at age seventy-four.

In his speech, Trump specified the targets of the crowd’s ire, “We got to get rid of the weak congresspeople, the ones that aren’t any good, the Liz Cheneys of the world.”129 As some of the crowd already descended on the Capitol, Pence became a target, too. He was not outside to see the gallows that had been constructed for him on the Capitol lawn, where the mob chanted “Hang Mike Pence! Hang Mike Pence!” as they surged forward.130

“We’ve Lost the Line!”

Minutes after McConnell finished his speech, both he and Pence were swiftly evacuated from the House floor by security. Congressional leaders were evacuated to Fort McNair for safety.131 The rioters had effectively stopped the certification, their one job that day. But they would thankfully not reach their targets inside. Thanks to the heroic efforts of Capitol Police Officer Eugene Goodman, who single-handedly directed rioters away from the chamber, members were able to flee through the hallways. Some came as close as 58 steps away from the rioters.

Security footage revealed later had captured Pence and his family fleeing down stairs—protestors steps away—with the nuclear football in tow.132 When advised to sit in an armored car for his safety, Pence refused, aware that the Secret Service would almost certainly speed him away and prevent him from doing his duty that day.133

At 2:38 p.m., Trump tweeted, “Please support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They are truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful!” The House chamber doors were now locked and barricaded with furniture, police drawing their weapons. Officers prepared tear gas and instructed members to retrieve gas masks from beneath their seats.134

Congressman Adam Kinzinger was in his office armed with a Ruger .380 pistol when, just two minutes after the last member evacuated the chamber, Ashli Babbitt attempted to climb through a smashed window of the hallway entrance. She was shot dead by an undercover officer tasked with rear security for the evacuation.135

Amid the turmoil, House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy called Trump, furious that there was no response. “Well, Kevin, I guess these people are more upset about the election than you are,” Trump replied. McCarthy exploded at him, screaming, “Who the fuck do you think you are talking to?” He demanded Trump intervene. At 3:13 p.m., Trump tweeted, “I am asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain peaceful. No violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law & Order—respect the Law and our great men and women in Blue. Thank you!” But when aides informed him that Pence was being threatened, he batted them away, saying Pence “deserved” it. “Maybe our supporters have the right idea.”136

The Response

As the events unfolded on January 6, General Milley saw a “Reichstag Moment” in the making, though he had not ever imagined that Trump would incite his supporters to attack the Capitol.137 At 2:30 p.m., Milley ran upstairs to the Secretary of Defense, Chris Miller, armed with a list of urgent actions. He called for the National Guard to be deployed immediately. Mayor Bowser and Capitol Police were already requesting assistance. He also wanted all available Department of Justice agents and suggested deploying Guard units from nearby states. Miller issued the order at 3:04 p.m.138

Congressional leaders holed up at Fort McNair had called the Pentagon with a similar request. Speaker Pelosi and Senator Schumer expressed skepticism about Miller's leadership, but Milley worked to reassure them.139 But the communication Milley was getting from the Whire House was just “politics, politics, politics.” Mark Meadows contacted him concerned only for appearances. “We have to kill the narrative that the vice president is making all the decisions. We need to establish the narrative that the president is still in charge.”

Alyssa Farah, a strategic communications adviser who had resigned over Trump’s false election claims, texted Meadows: “You guys have to say something. Even if the president’s not willing to put out a statement, you should go to the sticks and say, ‘We condemn this. Please stand down.’ If you don’t, people are going to die.”140 A White House staff member responded in frustration, “I’ve been trying for the last 30 minutes. Literally stormed in outer oval to get him to put out the first one. It’s completely insane.” It turns out Trump did not even want the words “stay peaceful” in his first tweet. He had to be forced.141

At 4:17 p.m., Trump released a video, expressing empathy for the rioters, “I know your pain. I know you’re hurt. We had an election that was stolen from us... So go home. We love you, you’re very special.”142

Liz Cheney appeared on Fox News, saying, “There is no question that the president formed the mob. The president incited the mob. The president addressed the mob. He lit the flame.”143 Journalist David Neiwert speculated that there was a delay in response due to the hope among some that enough violence would derail the certification of the election.144

The insurrection relied on the expectation of a counter-protest, perhaps by “Antifa,” which never happened. There was chaos about action and narrative now that there could be no justification for a draconian response, at least not against the left. This gap contributed to the proliferation of conspiracy theories that blamed Antifa for the violence, narratives quickly echoed by media outlets like Fox News.145

The National Guard finally arrived by 5:40 p.m., which Milley called “sprint speed.”146 In the end, there were five deaths and over 140 police injuries. Among the rioters were a milieu of active-duty military, police, Republican state legislators, and organized militia.147

Milley reflected later, “They shook the very republic to the core. Can you imagine what a group of people who are much more capable could have done?”148 And McConnell, who already privately noted his dislike of Trump before the election, now said he was “spiraling downward to the point of derangement.”149

Failed Insurrection

The Day After

The day following the insurrection, Trump issued a statement, “Even though I totally disagree with the outcome of the election, and the facts bear me out, nevertheless there will be an orderly transition on January 20th.”150 Military personnel were bivouacked in the Capitol for the first time since the Civil War, as Washington, D.C., remained under curfew.151 The Wall Street Journal editorial board called for Trump to resign, calling his actions the day before “impeachable.”152

Pelosi and Schumer reached out to Pence to get him to invoke the 25th Amendment to remove Trump from office. But Marc Short, Pence’s chief of staff, intercepted the calls and dismissed the request as a stunt, refusing to connect them.153 Behind the scenes, cabinet officials like Mike Pompeo and Steven Mnuchin quietly discussed the amendment themselves, but once Pence made it clear he was uninterested, these conversations largely ceased. Some cabinet members, like Betsy DeVos, simply resigned.

Impeachment

The final version of the impeachment article against Trump for the events of January 6th concluded: "In all this, President Trump gravely endangered the security of the United States and its institutions of Government. He threatened the integrity of the democratic system, interfered with the peaceful transition of power, and imperiled a coequal branch of Government. He thereby betrayed his trust as President, to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.”154

The impeachment trial commenced on February 9, 2021, with the witnesses as the jurors.155

During the proceedings, powerful video footage was shown on the Senate floor, eliciting emotional reactions from several senators. Representative Jamie Raskin noted the varied responses: Lisa Murkowski appeared “shell-shocked,” Mitt Romney looked “shaken” and “disapproving,” while Richard Burr was described as “ashen-faced” and angry. McConnell seemed “pained, confused—crying?” As the footage showed a police officer being crushed by the mob, Raskin wrote that McConnell “was tearing up, could lose it.”156

Trump’s reaction to the events of January 6th were completely the opposite of these Republican Senators. At a CNN town hall later, when asked, he replied “They were there proud, they were there with love in their heart. … And it was a beautiful day.” He expressed no regrets, though predictably he praised one aspect, a favorite: “Jan. 6: It was the largest crowd I’ve ever spoken to.”

In Congress, many Republicans now believed that the impeachment would pass in the House—and potentially even the Senate.157

Dead on Arrival

At 4:33 p.m., following 6.5 hours of debate, the House of Representatives voted to impeach Trump for a second time, with a final tally of 232 to 197. It marked a historic moment, for Trump became the only president to be impeached twice. Every Democrat voted to impeach. And ten Republicans joined them, representing the highest number of lawmakers ever to vote for impeachment of their own party’s president. But this was a steep drop from 30-40 Republicans that were possible weeks before, so what changed? Many simply worried they would be on the receiving end of a MAGA backlash.158

Only five Republicans agreed to even proceed to trial in the Senate. A senior leadership aide commented, “We needed to show we were fighting for Trump because the base was agitated.” Despite their best efforts to impeach an obviously impeachable president, Rand Paul crowed the case was now “dead on arrival.”159 Don Jr. was right on the afternoon of January 6th. This was Donald Trump’s Republican party.

The Trial

During the trial, the House managers opted not to emphasize Liz Cheney's public stance that Trump should be impeached out of concern for her safety. But she neither asked nor wanted for their protection.160

Before closing arguments, McConnell informed colleagues that he would vote not guilty. Since Trump was no longer president, their constitutional authority—in his view—had lapsed.161 The trial concluded with a vote of 57-43. Seven Republicans joined all Democrats to vote guilty. Like in the House, this marked the highest number from a president's own party to vote against him.162 Not frequently noted is that a majority found him guilty, just not enough to reach the high bar of the Constitution.

McConnell hinted that he would have supported a conviction if constitutional to try a former president. He said Trump would still find accountability outside the halls of Congress. “President Trump is still liable for everything he did while he was in office, as an ordinary citizen, unless the statute of limitations has run. He hasn’t gotten away with anything yet.”163

During the trial, Trump's lawyers had already made this argument, suggesting that there was no need to convict since he could still be subject to criminal prosecution after leaving office.164 Many in America thought he would. That was not to be the case.

The Courts

The Trump immunity decision in the Supreme Court was pivotal. It made it so that Trump would not face justice before the 2024 election, if ever.

“The presidential immunity concocted today would have blessed most of Nixon’s crimes. Nixon ordered his White House counsel to pay hush money to burglars in an Oval Office meeting on March 21, 1973. Presumptively an official act? He dangled clemency before E. Howard Hunt, one of the conspirators. Use of the pardon power — entirely immune? He resigned when a tape revealed he had ordered the CIA to go to the FBI to end the investigation of the burglars sent by his campaign committee. ‘Play it tough,’ he told his White House chief of staff. On its face, official.” — Michael Waldman, President of the Brennan Center for Justice165

The disagreement between conservatives and liberals in the Court was perhaps the starkest in American history. And that disagreement extended to other cases around January 6th, as well. The insurrection clause in the 14th Amendment—the clearest path to accountability for insurrectionists—now seemed to have its enforcement entirely in doubt. In their dissent, Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson write that the majority’s new interpretation of the Constitution “simply creates a special rule for the insurrection disability in Section 3.”

And Trump himself, despite what McConnell and his own lawyers at impeachment claimed, has seen no accountability. Voters' desire to be informed has no impact on the judicial process. Judge Tanya Chutkan, presiding over his case, emphasized that she would not allow the political campaign to influence her work as a judge—or the timing of the cases.166

Will He Leave?

As the inauguration approached, concerns about Trump’s potential actions loomed large among lawmakers. Senator Susan Collins expressed her anxiety, “What I worried about... was whether he would literally refuse to leave the White House and, if so, what would happen?”167 A top aide also recalled, “Right up until the last night, I was concerned something would happen.”168

Their fears were not just speculative. Just three days before the inauguration, Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene texted Mark Meadows, sharing that some Republicans in Congress believed Trump should declare martial law.169

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi shared her own apprehensions with General Milley, asking, “What precautions are available to prevent an unstable president from initiating military hostilities or from accessing the launch codes and ordering a nuclear strike?” Milley reassured her, saying, “I can guarantee you, you can take it to the bank, that there’ll be... that the nuclear triggers are secure and we’re not going to do—we’re not going to allow anything crazy, illegal, immoral or unethical to happen.”170

Milley himself was proactive. He called the 24-hour command center to ensure that no orders, should Trump issue them, would be taken outside the established chain of command. And were there any unlawful orders, he wanted to know. In the mind of this history nerd was the precedent of Nixon’s presidency, when the Defense Secretary warned his generals not to execute a nuclear launch order before talking to him or Henry Kissinger.171

Trump did, in fact, leave the White House. Though in a departure from tradition, he became the first president since Andrew Jackson to refuse to attend the swearing-in of his successor.172

Were he to return, his former National Security Adviser, John Bolton, has some thoughts: “A second Trump term would be day after day of constitutional crisis — the Justice Department one day, the Pentagon the next and Homeland Security the next.”173 We have already seen what that looks like once, when Trump did not know his limits until he tested them. As in 1923, he has learned from the mistakes of his failure that day. In a second term, he will not repeat them. And the far-right has laid the groundwork to ensure that, next time, he has no limits.